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Abstract
The existence of a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in
qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical dif-
ferentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable
cost. The alternative cases of partial and full market coverage are
considered. It is shown that there exists a parameter range where the
incentive to decrease di¤erentiation arises for the high-quality …rm,
preventing …rms to reach a pure-strategy duopoly equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
In the existing literature on vertical product di¤erentiation, quality improve-
ments imply alternatively a …xed or a variable cost. The nature of technology
largely a¤ects the equilibrium market structure (for a review, see Anderson et
al., 1992, chapter 8). The well known …niteness property obtains when quality
improvements require either a …xed cost possibly represented by R&D e¤orts,
or a variable cost which does not increase too fast as quality increases (Gab-
szewicz and Thisse, 1979, 1980; Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983). Otherwise,
with su¢ciently convex variable costs of quality, a segmented market struc-
ture obtains, as in horizontal di¤erentiation models à la Hotelling (1929).
As stressed by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986), vertical di¤erentiation models
are generally expected to generate pure-strategy equilibria where prices are
strictly above marginal production costs. On the contrary, under horizontal
product di¤erentiation, an established result is that a pure-strategy equilib-
rium in prices may not always exist (see, inter alia, d’Aspremont et al., 1979;
Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1986; Economides, 1986; Anderson, 1988). More
precisely, a subgame perfect equilibrium with prices greater than marginal
cost may fail to exist, because …rms’ location choices drive prices to marginal
cost.1
To our knowledge, all existing contributions on vertical product di¤eren-
tiation assume either partial or full market coverage. The only paper where
the extent of market coverage is endogenously determined by …rms’ strate-
gic interaction is due to Wauthy (1996), analysing a vertically di¤erentiated
duopoly where …rms produce at no cost. He identi…es the parameter ranges
where either full or partial market coverage arises at equilibrium, as well as
a range where a corner solution at the price stage obtains, in which the low-
quality …rm’s price extracts all the surplus from the individual located at the
lower bound of the support of consumer’s distribution. He proves that such a
corner solution is indeed the pure-strategy subgame perfect price equilibrium
in the relevant range.
We consider a duopoly model of vertical di¤erentiation with quadratic
costs of quality improvements, so that the …niteness property does not hold.
1Obviously, a price equilibrium in mixed strategies always exists (Dasgupta and Maskin,
1986; Osborne and Pitchick, 1987).
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We investigate the existence and characterization of pure-strategy subgame
perfect equilibria for a …xed market size. The alternative cases of full and
partial market coverage are considered. We show that the parameter intervals
in which the two alternative regimes can arise are disjoint. In order to de…ne
the demand structure in the parameter range where neither partial nor full
market coverage can be properly de…ned, we prove that the low-quality …rm
sets her price to extract all the surplus of the poorest consumer in the market.
Our …ndings reveal that, in such interval of demand parameters, a pure-
strategy equilibrium fails to exist. This is due to the incentive for the high-
quality …rm to set a quality such that the rival’s sales are driven to zero.
Should …rms produce at zero cost, as in Wauthy (1996), the non-existence
problem would disappear, due to the incentive for the high-quality producer
to supply the highest quality which is technologically feasible.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is laid
out in section 2, describing the alternative cases of partial and full market
coverage. Section 3 contains the proof of the non-existence of a pure-strategy
equilibrium with prices above marginal costs. Concluding remarks are pre-
sented in section 4.
2 The model
We describe a model of vertically di¤erentiated duopoly under complete in-
formation. Each …rm produces a vertically di¤erentiated good, with qH ¸
qL, and then competes in prices against the rival. There exists a contin-
uum of consumers indexed by their marginal willingness to pay for quality
µ 2 [µ0; µ1]; with µ0 = µ1 ¡ 1: The distribution of consumers is uniform,
with density f (µ) = 1, so that the total mass of consumers is also 1. Each
consumer buys one unit of the product i that yields the highest net surplus
U = µqi ¡ pi; i = H;L:
Production technology involves variable costs, which are quadratic in the
quality level and linear in the output level:
Ci = q
2
i xi i = H;L; (1)
where xi indicates the output level of …rm i. Firm i ’s pro…t function is
¼i = (pi ¡ q2i )xi: (2)
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Competition between …rms is fully noncooperative and takes place in
two stages. In the …rst, …rms set their respective quality levels; then, in
the second, which is the proper market stage, they compete in prices. The
solution concept applied is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward
induction. In the remainder of the section, we describe the two alternative
equilibria that can arise under either full or partial market coverage.
2.1 Full market coverage
This setting follows the analysis presented in several contributions (Moorthy,
1988; Champsaur and Rochet, 1989; Cremer and Thisse, 1994; Lambertini,
1996). Suppose all consumers are able to buy, i.e., µ1 is su¢ciently high
to allow for full market coverage. Given generic prices and qualities, the
”location” of the consumer indi¤erent between the two varieties is h = (pH¡
pL)=(qH¡qL); so that market demands are xH = µ1¡h and xL = h¡(µ1¡1):
Consider the market stage. From the …rst order conditions (FOCs hence-
forth),
@¼H
@pH
= µ1 ¡ 2pH ¡ pL + q
2
H
qH ¡ qL = 0; (3)
@¼L
@pL
=
pH ¡ 2pL + q2L
qL(qH ¡ qL) ¡ (µ1 ¡ 1) = 0; (4)
the following equilibrium prices obtain:
pH =
(qH ¡ qL)(µ1 + 1) + 2q2H + q2L
3
; pL =
(qH ¡ qL)(2¡ µ1) + 2q2L + q2H
3
(5)
Substituting and rearranging, we get the pro…t functions de…ned exclusively
in terms of qualities, ¼i(qH ; qL): The subgame perfect quality levels are
qH =
4µ1 + 1
8
; qL =
4µ1 ¡ 5
8
; (6)
which entails the general constraint µ1 ¸ 9=4; in order for the poorest con-
sumer to be in a position to buy the low-quality product. The correspond-
ing equilibrium pro…ts are ¼H = ¼L = 3=16; and equilibrium demands are
xH = xL = 1=2: Observe that the socially optimal qualities would be the
…rst and third quartiles of the interval [µ0=2; µ1=2]; which obtains from the
calculation of the preferred varieties for the richest and the poorest consumer
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in the market, if such varieties were sold at marginal cost. This implies that
(i) qualities are set, respectively, too low and too high as compared to the
social optimum; and (ii) this model shares its general features with the model
of spatial competition with quadratic transportation costs (see Cremer and
Thisse, 1994).2
2.2 Partial market coverage
Consider now the case where the market is partially covered. We retain the
set of assumptions introduced above, except that now there exists a consumer
who is indi¤erent between buying the low-quality good and not buying at all.
His location along the spectrum of the marginal willingness to pay is given
by the ratio k = pL=qL, so that now market demands are xH = µ1 ¡ h and
xL = h¡ k: Given the cost function (1), the pro…t function of …rm i remains
de…ned as in (2).
Again, proceeding backwards, the FOCs for noncooperative pro…t maxi-
mization are
@¼H
@pH
= µ1 ¡ 2pH ¡ pL + q
2
H
qH ¡ qL = 0; (7)
@¼L
@pL
=
pHqL ¡ 2pLqH + qHq2L
qL(qH ¡ qL) = 0: (8)
Observe that (7) coincides with (3) since the demand function for the high-
quality good is the same in both settings. Solving the system (7-8), one
obtains the following equilibrium prices:
pH =
qH(2µ1qH + 2q
2
H ¡ 2µ1qL + q2L)
4qH ¡ qL ; pL =
qL(µ1qH + q
2
H ¡ µ1qL + 2qHqL)
4qH ¡ qL
(9)
as the equilibrium prices. Substituting and simplifying, we get the following
expressions de…ning the …rms’ pro…t functions at the quality stage:
2It can be shown that, under full market coverage, the spatial model with quadratic
transportation costs is actually a special case of a vertical di¤erentiation model with
quadratic costs of quality improvement (Cremer and Thisse, 1991).
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¼H =
q2H(qH ¡ qL)(2µ1 ¡ 2qH ¡ qL)2
(4qH ¡ qL)2 ; ¼L =
qHqL(qH ¡ qL)(µ1 + qH ¡ qL)2
(4qH ¡ qL)2 :
(10)
The corresponding FOCs are:
@¼H
@qH
=
qH
(4qH ¡ qL)3 (16µ
2
1q
2
H ¡ 64µ1q3H + 48q4H ¡ 12µ21qHqL + 48µ1q2HqL¡
¡20q3HqL + 8µ21q2L ¡ 12µ1qHq2L ¡ 12q2Hq2L ¡ 8µ1q3L + 9qHq3L + 2q4L) = 0; (11)
@¼L
@qL
=
qH
(4qH ¡ qL)3 (4µ
2
1q
2
H + 8µ1q
3
H + 4q
4
H ¡ 7µ21qHqL ¡ 30µ1q2HqL ¡ 23q3HqL+
+24µ1qHq
2
L + 36q
2
Hq
2
L ¡ 2µ1q3L ¡ 19qHq3L + 2q4L) = 0; (12)
whose solution gives the unregulated Nash equilibrium qualities, q¤H =
0:40976µ1 and q¤L = 0:199361µ1:
3 Equilibrium prices are p¤H = 0:2267µ
2
1;
p¤L = 0:075µ
2
1, outputs are x
¤
H = 0:2792µ1; x
¤
L = 0:3445µ1; while pro…ts
amount to ¼¤H = 0:0164µ
3
1; ¼
¤
L = 0:0121µ
3
1:
The equilibrium values of …rms’ pro…ts are acceptable if total equilibrium
demand is at most equal to one, i.e., k ¸ µ0; which implies the constraint
µ1 · 1:6032: Otherwise, the marginal willingness to pay of the consumer
supposedly indi¤erent between buying the low-quality good and not buying
at all falls below the lower bound of the interval assumed for µ: If this is the
case, i.e., µ1 > 1:6032; then the above speci…cation of demand functions is
no longer valid.
The discussion carried out in this section leads to the following:
Proposition 1 If µ1 2 [1; 1:6032]; there exists a unique subgame perfect equi-
librium in pure strategies, yielding partial market coverage. If µ1 ¸ 9=4; there
exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, yielding full
market coverage.
In the next section, we investigate the existence of a subgame perfect
equilibrium in the interval µ1 2 (1:6032; 9=4):
3This can be veri…ed through numerical calculations, initially performed by normalizing
µ1 to 1. Then, increasing µ1 shows that the relationship between equilibrium qualities and
µ1 is linear. The proof that leapfrogging is not pro…table is omitted since it is in Motta
(1993).
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3 A non-existence proof
Suppose µ1 2 (1:6032; 9=4): In this interval, the price behaviour of the low-
quality …rm is described by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For all µ1 2 (1:6032; 9=4); the only candidate as a pure-strategy
equilibrium price for the low-quality good is pL = (µ1 ¡ 1)qL:
Proof. Suppose, …rst, that the price of the low-quality …rm is as in the partial
coverage case, given by (9). If so, the consumer indi¤erent between buying
the low quality and not buying at all, is located below µ0: This contradicts
the hypothesis of partial market coverage. Suppose now, alternatively, that
the price of the low-quality …rm is as in (5). In this case, the consumer
indi¤erent between buying the low quality and not buying at all, is located
above µ0; contradicting the hypothesis of full market coverage under which
(5) has been obtained.
The price set by the high-quality …rm is the best reply to pL :
pH =
µ1qH + q
2
H ¡ qL
2
: (13)
Notice that this best reply obtains from the same reaction function, irrespec-
tively of the extent of market coverage.4 The pro…t functions simplify as
follows:
¼H =
(q2H ¡ µ1qH + qL)2
4(qH ¡ qL) ; ¼L =
qL(µ1 ¡ 1¡ qL)
2(qH ¡ qL) (2qH ¡ µ1qH + q
2
H ¡ qL):
(14)
On the basis of (14), we are going to show the following
Proposition 2 For any µ1 2 (1:6032; 9=4); there exists no subgame perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies in the two-stage game.
Proof. Examine the …rst derivative of the high-quality …rm’s pro…t function
w.r.t. qH :
@¼H
@qH
=
(qL ¡ µ1qH + q2H)(2µ1qL ¡ qL ¡ µ1qH ¡ 4qHqL + 3q2H)
16(qH ¡ qL)2 ; (15)
4The reaction function of the high-quality …rm is the same in both regimes because the
de…nition of the demand function for the high-quality good is independent of the extent
of market coverage.
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which is equal to zero at eqH = µµ1 +qµ21 ¡ 4qL¶=2; where the pro…ts of the
high-quality …rm are minimised and amount to ¼H = 0 because pH = ~q2H
and xH = 0: Notice that no level of qH larger than eqH is acceptable, since it
would imply both pH < q2H and xH < 0:
Moreover, there exists a quality qMH =
³
µ1 ¡ 2 +
q
(µ1 ¡ 2)2 + 4qL
´
=2
such that xL = 0; i.e., the high-quality …rm becomes a monopolist. It can
be shown that qL < qMH < eqH for all qL < µ1 ¡ 1: The latter inequality
is veri…ed both in the right neighbourhood of µ1 = 1:6032, and in the left
neighbourhood of µ1 = 9=4: A su¢cient condition for this to obtain for any
µ1 2 (1:6032; 9=4); is that qL is not increasing too fast as µ1 increases. To
verify this, consider that a viability condition for the low-quality …rm, for
any level of the marginal willingness to pay, is µqL ¸ q2L; given that price has
to be at least equal to unit production cost. Any increase in product quality
yields
µdqL ¸ 2qLdqL (16)
which simpli…es to qL · µ=2; implying that @qL=@µ · 1=2:5
The above discussion implies that, for any admissible level of qL; the high-
quality …rm …nds it pro…table to produce qMH : If so, the low-quality …rm must
increase her quality-price ratio in order to have a positive demand. To this
aim, she could either increase the quality or decrease the price. Obviously,
the …rst option is not viable, in that for all qL there exists a qMH (qL) such that
the pro…ts of the low-quality …rm are nil. The second option, i.e., setting
any price pL < (µ1 ¡ 1)qL, contradicts Lemma 1.
Alternatively, one can imagine that, when the high-quality …rm is pro-
ducing qMH ; the low-quality …rm could …nd it pro…table to leapfrog the rival.
In such a case, …rms would exchange roles, and the former high-quality …rm
should set a price such that the surplus of the consumer located at µ1 ¡ 1
would be nil. If so, the whole argument above repeats.
The intuition behind the above result can be outlined as follows. If the
low-quality …rm’s price is such that the poorest consumer in the market en-
joys zero surplus, then the high-quality …rm …nds it pro…table to decrease
her quality level to qMH ; in order to increase her market share. The reaction
of the low-quality …rm would be to allow the consumer in µ0 to enjoy a pos-
itive surplus, either by decreasing price, which violates the market demand
5This result has been shown by Delbono, Denicolò and Scarpa (1996).
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speci…cation, or by o¤ering a higher quality. However, since qMH exists for all
acceptable levels of qL; increasing quality does not yield positive pro…ts for
the low-quality …rm. The combination of these two facts prevents …rms from
reaching a pure-strategy equilibrium in prices. The shape of the high-quality
…rm’s pro…t function is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1 : The high-quality …rm’s pro…t function
6
-
¼H
qMH
qHeqH
Finally, we brie‡y discuss the above results in contrast with the analysis
conducted by Wauthy (1996) in a model where …rms produce at no cost. Un-
der this assumption, any incentive for the high-quality producer to decrease
quality in order to reduce production costs, and/or increase the market share
for her variety, disappears and her pro…t function is everywhere increasing
in qH : Hence, a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium in qualities and
prices always exists, under either full or partial market coverage, or when a
corner solution arises at the price stage (see Proposition 1 in Wauthy (1996,
p. 348)).
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4 Concluding remarks
In the foregoing analysis, we have investigated the existence of a pure-strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium in a duopoly model of vertical di¤erentiation
with convex variable costs of quality. We have shown that there are parame-
ter ranges where a pure strategy equilibrium exists (i) under partial market
coverage, if consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for quality is relatively
low; (ii) under full market coverage, if consumers’ marginal willingness to
pay for quality is relatively high. However, these two intervals are disjoint.
In such intermediate parameter range, we have proved that the low-quality
…rm is constrained to price so as to extract all the surplus from the poorest
consumer in the market. This, in turn, induces the high-quality …rm to de-
crease her quality towards the rival’s, in order to increase her market share.
This argument, in combination with the possibility for the low-quality …rm
to leapfrog the rival, entails that a pure-strategy duopoly equilibrium does
not exist. This cannot happen in a model where production costs are nil, as
assumed by Wauthy (1996).
The above …ndings reveal that, contrary to previous beliefs, vertical dif-
ferentiation models su¤er from a problem of non-existence of the equilibrium
in pure strategies which a¤ects spatial di¤erentiation models. While in spa-
tial models the non-existence is due to an insu¢cient degree of convexity of
transportation costs, in vertical di¤erentiation models it appears to be due
to the convexity of production costs in a subset of the parameter space where
a corner solution in prices is the unique candidate as a Nash equilibrium at
the market stage.
10
References
[1] Anderson, S.P. (1988), ”Equilibrium Existence in the Linear Model of
Spatial Competition”, Economica, 55, 479-91.
[2] Anderson, S.P., A. de Palma and J.-F. Thisse (1992), Discrete Choice
Theory of Product Di¤erentiation, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
[3] Champsaur, P. and J.-C. Rochet (1989), ”Multiproduct Duopolists”,
Econometrica, 57, 533-57.
[4] Choi, J.C. and H.S. Shin (1992), ”A Comment on a Model of Vertical
Product Di¤erentiation”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 40, 229-31.
[5] Cremer, H. and J.-F. Thisse (1991), ”Location Models of Horizontal Dif-
ferentiation: A Special Case of Vertical Di¤erentiation Models”, Journal
of Industrial Economics, 39, 383-90.
[6] Cremer, H. and J.-F. Thisse (1994), ”Commodity Taxation in a Di¤er-
entiated Oligopoly”, International Economic Review, 35, 613-33.
[7] Dasgupta, P. and E. Maskin (1986), ”The Existence of Equilibrium in
Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications”, Review of Economic
Studies, 53, 27-42.
[8] d’Aspremont, C., J.J. Gabszewicz and J.-F. Thisse (1979), ”On
Hotelling’s ‘Stability in Competition”’, Econometrica, 47, 1145-50.
[9] Delbono, F., V. Denicolò and C. Scarpa (1996), ”Quality Choice in a
Vertically Di¤erentiated Mixed Duopoly”, Economic Notes, 25, 33-46.
[10] Economides, N. (1986), ”Minimal and Maximal Di¤erentiation in
Hotelling’s Duopoly”, Economics Letters, 21, 67-71.
[11] Gabszewicz, J.J. and J.-F. Thisse (1979), ”Price Competition, Quality
and Income Disparities”, Journal of Economic Theory, 20, 340-59.
[12] Gabszewicz, J.J. and J.-F. Thisse (1980), ”Entry (and Exit) in a Di¤er-
entiated Industry”, Journal of Economic Theory, 22, 327-38.
11
[13] Gabszewicz, J.J. and J.-F. Thisse (1986), ”On the Nature of Competi-
tion with Di¤erentiated Products”, Economic Journal, 96, 160-72.
[14] Hotelling, H. (1929), ”Stability in Competition”, Economic Journal, 39,
41-57.
[15] Lambertini, L. (1996), ”Choosing Roles in a Duopoly for Endogenously
Di¤erentiated Products”, Australian Economic Papers, 35, 205-24.
[16] Moorthy, K.S. (1988), ”Product and Price Competition in a Duopoly
Model”, Marketing Science, 7, 141-68.
[17] Motta, M. (1993), ”Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs Quantity Com-
petition”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 41, 113-32.
[18] Osborne, M.J. and C. Pitchick (1987), ”Equilibrium in Hotelling’s Model
of Spatial Competition”, Econometrica, 55, 911-22.
[19] Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1982), ”Relaxing Price Competition through
Product Di¤erentiation”, Review of Economic Studies, 69, 3-13.
[20] Shaked, A. and J. Sutton (1983), ”Natural Oligopolies”, Econometrica,
51, 1469-83.
[21] Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge,
MA, MIT Press.
[22] Wauthy, X. (1996), ”Quality Choice in Models of Vertical Di¤erentia-
tion”, Journal of Industrial Economics, 44, 345-53.
12
